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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
NOTICE IS NOT ENOUGH: WHY TILA REQUIRES MORE 
THAN A LETTER OF INTENT 
Levi Smith* 
The federal Truth in Lending Act1 (TILA) provides borrowers 
with protections and remedies against certain actions by lenders. 
TILA allows, in some circumstances, a borrower to rescind a loan 
from a lender within a three-year period from when the loan is 
made. However, a circuit split has developed regarding how the 
right to rescind must be exercised. Of the circuits that have 
considered this question, some require a lawsuit to be filed within 
the three-year period to rescind the loan.2 Other circuits have held 
that providing notice of the intent to rescind the loan within the 
three-year period is sufficient to rescind the loan, even if a lawsuit 
is not filed until beyond the three-year time limit.3 This Comment 
argues that in order to rescind the loan, courts should require that 
an actual lawsuit be filed before the three-year period expires. 
TILA was enacted to ensure that borrowers could make 
informed decisions about consumer loans.4 In fact, TILA is one of 
the most powerful tools that borrowers have to protect themselves 
from predatory and unscrupulous lenders.5 To ensure that lenders 
comply with TILA’s disclosure requirements, TILA grants 
borrowers a limited right to rescind a loan secured by the 
borrower’s residence if the lender fails to make the required 
disclosures.6 This incentivizes lenders to follow the requirements 
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of the Act. Under TILA, a borrower has a three-day period 
following the consummation of the loan to exercise their right to 
rescind.7 However, when a lender fails to provide the required 
disclosures to the borrower, TILA provides that the time for 
rescission is extended for three years or until the property is sold, 
whichever is earlier.8 This three-year period is a statute of repose 
that governs “the life of the underlying right” to rescind.9 The 
right to rescind is completely extinguished at the end of the three-
year period.10 
Although the right to rescind is clearly established by the 
statute, a circuit split regarding the proper way and time to 
exercise this right has developed in the circuits that have 
addressed this issue.  In the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, a borrower 
must actually file a lawsuit to enforce the borrower’s right to 
rescind within the three-year statute of repose.11 If the lawsuit is 
not filed within the three-year period, the right to rescind is lost.12 
But in the Fourth Circuit, the right is preserved beyond the three-
year period if the borrower provides notice to the lender that the 
borrower intends to rescind the loan.13 An actual lawsuit does not 
need to be filed within the three-year period.14 
Resolution of this divergence depends on either a United 
States Supreme Court ruling or congressional action to clarify the 
procedural aspects of the rescission provision of TILA. In the 
interim, the split has implications for lenders, borrowers, and the 
mortgage industry. Lenders are more likely to receive from 
borrowers rescission notices that purport to preserve the right to 
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rescind even if a lawsuit is not filed within three years. Given that 
asserting an intention to rescind is without cost (unlike a lawsuit), 
it’s likely that lenders will receive more of these notices in an 
attempt by borrowers to influence restructuring and foreclosure 
negotiations by threatening full rescission, even beyond the three-
year period. Consequently, depending on the jurisdiction in which 
a suit is ultimately brought, this notice may be effective. In those 
cases, lenders cannot be certain that a loan transaction is final 
even after the three-year statute of repose has expired. Such 
practice will likely add monitoring and response costs to loans, 
which may ultimately be passed on to the borrower in the form of 
higher fees or interest rates.15The circuit split also creates 
unnecessary uncertainty for borrowers. Borrowers must 
investigate the governing law in their jurisdiction and ensure that 
the right to rescission is not lost if a suit is not filed within three 
years. As borrowers are often less informed and sophisticated than 
lenders, such uncertainty may place a burden and inequity upon 
these individuals. 
The approach taken by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits requiring 
a lawsuit to be filed within three years is the best resolution of this 
circuit split. Such a rule provides the clearest notice to the lender 
that the borrower is seeking to enforce the legal right to rescind. 
This rule also encourages a borrower to sue only if the borrower 
has a non-frivolous claim for rescission, rather than allowing the 
borrower to give mere notice of rescission to influence 
negotiations between the two parties. As this “notice” would not be 
governed by the same rules that govern legal actions, including 
rules that provide sanctions for frivolous lawsuits,16 there is less of 
an incentive for borrowers to assess the merits of their claims 
before seeking to rescind. Requiring a lawsuit to be filed within 
three years also provides more certainty to lenders and borrowers 
on the status of the rescission claim, and ultimately reduces the 
cost to borrowers of dealing with these claims. These cost savings 
may be passed on to consumers, thus improving the lending 
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climate for those in need of secured capital.17 
Finally, this rule maintains the policy purposes of a statute of 
repose. Potential defendants are insured repose after the lapse of 
time.18 A strict limit “encourages prompt assertion of claims to 
allow full and fair litigation of the issues” while evidence, 
documentation, and witnesses are more recent and available.19 
“Thus, the private interests of potential defendants are served” in 
resolving claims filed within the time period, “while public 
interests are served as well by keeping stale litigation out of the 
courts, barring inefficient use of limited public resources.”20 The 
certainty and efficiency that this outcome promotes is both 
embodied by the governing law and is an equitable resolution for 
both lenders and borrowers.  
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